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INTRODUCTION

The widespread use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in domestic law enforcement is imminent. Every police department, chief, and beat officer in the United States
dreams of the ability to have eyes everywhere—a constant panoramic view
of every angle in every precinct with the ability to instantly zoom in on
suspicious behavior. That ability is available now. And it is on sale, cheap.
The problem is regulatory uncertainty surrounding operations of UAVs in
American airspace, and no one wants to be the guinea pig. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), tasked with ensuring the safe and orderly
operation of aircraft, is regulating UAV operations of the kind that domestic
law enforcement wants. The FAA has effectively stopped domestic law
enforcement agencies from operating small UAVs in their operations
without running afoul of FAA regulations for now. Nonetheless, the law
enforcement industry is clamoring for the new tools. Finally, use of small
UAVs raises potentially thorny Fourth Amendment issues and will not go
unnoticed by lawyers and civil liberty groups. The privacy issues raised by
the potential ubiquity of UAVs go beyond the current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
This article will begin first with a discussion of the problem background, canvass the operational abilities of current UAVs, and explore the
regulatory and constitutional limitations affecting their use. Second, the
article will illustrate the burdensome process a local law enforcement
agency must endure to utilize UAVs in operations and avoid administrative
enforcement action. Third, the article will assess recent regulatory developments in regard to the domestic operation of small UAVs. The article will
conclude by exploring where Fourth Amendment jurisprudence might go
when society is faced with continuous, ubiquitous airborne surveillance.
II. PROBLEM BACKGROUND
Every technological step forward in remote sensing raises potential
Fourth Amendment issues, and the implications of law enforcement and
executive use of ever cheaper and more numerous surveillance tools are not
fleshed out until the highest courts profess their opinions, sometimes years
later. And in the interim, even newer technologies have rendered the
original technologies and questions obsolete. Even legislative oversight is
ineffective—a deliberative organ‟s skills at playing technological “whacka-mole” are futile when compared to the rate of industry advancement.
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The societal questions raised by today‟s law enforcement use of
cutting-edge surveillance technology in day-to-day operations will need to
be answered at the same level they are raised—on the ground. There is no
precedent that squarely addresses privacy implications of governmental use
of a technology that allows essentially permanent, multi-dimensional,
multi-sensory surveillance of citizens twenty-four hours per day. A hypothetical example approaching that kind of surveillance ability would be a
police officer‟s access to a Google Earth1-like display, with a point of view
that could be moved or zoomed anywhere in three dimensions, coupled
with real-time visual, audio, thermal, or other sensing. God-like sensory
omniscience, in other words. Individual law enforcement officers‟ abilities
could be multiplied with a flock of small UAVs, exponentially increasing
the state‟s power to continually monitor its citizenry.
Our Constitutional jurisprudence, demographics, and technological
ability to remotely sense almost anyone, anywhere, at anytime, seem to be
the ingredients necessary for a police state. But interestingly, law enforcement has not taken full advantage of the potential tools available to them—
perhaps for regulatory impediments, for budgetary constraints, or to avoid
running afoul of the Constitution. At any rate, permanent, ubiquitous
surveillance is not the stuff of fiction anymore. So what could usher us into
the brave new world of a big brother-like security state? Off-the-shelf technology, an updated regulatory scheme, and outdated Fourth Amendment
cases could.
A. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE UAVS AND SYSTEMS
Although Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Aerial Systems
are not new,2 their use in domestic law enforcement is new and imminent.
The UAS industry, regulators, and researchers are moving closer to adopting rules and regulations that would allow the use of UAVs in civil airspace, but the present state of affairs resembles an aeronautical Wild West.
Production of civilian UAVs has exploded in recent years, and is forecast to continue to grow exponentially.3 Once almost the exclusive purview

1. See Google Earth, www.earth.google.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (illustrating potential
surveillance capabilities).
2. For example, the Ryan Aeronautical Company developed the Firebee in 1951, which was
a jet-powered target drone. It was one of the most widely-used target drones ever built.
3. Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total Over $80 Billion in its Just
Released 2010 UAV Market Profile and Forecast, PRNEWSWIRE.COM, Feb. 1, 2010,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/teal-group-predicts-worldwide-uav-market-will-totalover-80-billion-in-its-just-released-2010-uav-market-profile-and-forecast-83233947 html (“Teal
Group‟s 2010 market study estimates that UAV spending will more than double over the next
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of military operations, UAVs designed for civilian use, such as atmospheric
research, agricultural operations, spying, and information relay are available
for purchase now. A representative example is the MLB Company‟s BAT4, an off-the-shelf ready to fly UAS:
Bat 4 is a complete man-portable UAV system that operates autonomously and delivers high quality video imagery. A ready-to-fly
aircraft with standard sensor payload and complete ground station
is available starting at US $35,000. The Bat 4 UAV has a wingspan of 13 feet, weighs only 55 to 100 pounds, and can fly for up
to 8 hours (12 with optional wing tanks).4
Its advertised uses include “[u]rban monitoring” and “[a]erial mapping.”5 Although it looks rather ungainly, its ability to loiter for up to 12
hours over urban areas, peering down with a three-dimensional gimbaled
camera capable of magnification by 25 times in any weather conditions or
at night, thanks to its infrared camera, gives it advantages far beyond those
of human piloted aircraft. By way of comparison, a police department
wishing to purchase a standard Bell model 206 helicopter for aerial surveillance can expect to pay $875,000 up front for a basic machine capable
of a maximum of 4.5 hours of flight time, requiring two or more crewmembers, and costing approximately $500 per hour to operate.6 For the
same price as the Bell 206 helicopter, that department could instead
purchase around 40 Bat-4 UAVs plus launcher and associated equipment
that require zero trained crewmembers to operate and costs less than $5 per
hour to operate, per aircraft.7
That was but one example of how relatively inexpensive UASs are
compared to manned aircraft. Many manufacturers of UAS offer similar
products, and law enforcement agencies around the country have calculated
that it would be entirely feasible to equip each patrol officer‟s car with a
UAS in the trunk. The potential uses of a UAS in tandem with a patrol
officer are many. The UAV could fly along several hundred feet above the
patrol car, giving the officer a real-time bird‟s eye view of the situations
developing around his or her patrol beat. The need for risky high-speed
pursuit of fleeing suspects would be eliminated, since the UAV could
decade from current worldwide UAV expenditures of $4.9 billion annually to $11.5 billion,
totaling just over $80 billion in the next ten years.”).
4. The MLB Company, http://spyplanes.com/pages_new/products htm (follow “Bat 4”
hyperlink to find downloadable PDF file) (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
5. Id.
6. See Bell Helicopter, http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/commercial/bell206B3.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
7. See The MLB Company, http://spyplanes.com/pages_new/products htm (last visited Mar.
8, 2010).
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simply track the suspect from above. Or several UAVs could be posted to
orbit and monitor suspected drug distribution locations, freeing officers for
other duties until enough evidence is gathered with the UAV sensors to
obtain a search warrant.
Those examples are relatively simple in keeping with the simplicity
and ease of use of a small UAV. Most small UAVs are flown via “point
and click” on a laptop computer, with the vehicle itself controlled by its
own internal autopilot, receiving guidance instructions via a radio or satellite link.8 Some larger UAVs can be hand flown by qualified pilots, but it is
not necessary to be a trained pilot to operate a small, autonomous UAV.
Operators merely select the operation they wish the UAV to perform,
whether that is orbiting over a single location, tracking a moving target, or
patrolling a set area. The newest technologies allow the UAV to monitor an
area for certain interesting activity and then track that activity when it
begins, wherever it goes, using artificial intelligence programs in its flight
computers. Those are more expensive, experimental technologies, but they
are quickly becoming commercially available.9
The currently available UAS technologies have given law enforcement
officers tools never available before now. The ability to continuously monitor suspected criminals from above in all weather and visibility conditions
multiplies law enforcement‟s executive power and abilities. Legislative
oversight, however, is lagging behind the commercial development and
marketing of these new tools. The current regulatory scheme is inadequate
to deal with the novel issues raised by use of UAVs in law enforcement.
B. CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY SCHEME
The current regulatory scheme in place in the domestic U.S. airspace is
a mixture of constitutional jurisprudence and administrative regulation.
Although it was not long ago that the Supreme Court rejected the idea of
cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, where a landowner owned everything above his or her property out to the edge of the universe,10 the courts
are in general agreement that landowners own as much airspace above their
property as they can reasonably use,11 and everything else is akin to a
“public highway.”12 The seminal “ownership” cases are factually limited to
airport expansion or construction nearby, with the result that aircraft end up
8. E.g., Insitu Co., http://www.insitu.com/scaneagle (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
9. See P.W. SINGER., WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
21ST CENTURY 355-356 (Penguin Press 2009).
10. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946).
11. Id. at 264.
12. Id. at 261.
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flying unreasonably low over a house, or the airport‟s presence results in
restrictive zoning regulations.13 The constitutional limits on ownership of
airspace generally limit the remedy of an aggrieved property owner to an
action in inverse condemnation14 or to a challenge of the zoning restrictions
under the Fifth Amendment takings clause.15 Therefore, contemporary
constitutional takings claims for flight over a person‟s property are unlikely
to survive outside close proximity to an airport, and even then, federal law
and airspace regulations favor public use of airspace.16
The Air Commerce Act17 allows the flying public the use of all public
airspace above the minimum safe altitudes and use of lower altitudes for
takeoff and landing.18 Minimum safe altitudes are generally defined as no
lower than 500 feet above the surface generally, or no closer than 500 feet
horizontally and vertically from any person, structure, vessel, or vehicle,
and no lower than 1,000 feet above congested areas19 for fixed wing
aircraft, and “less than the minimums [for airplanes] if the operation is
conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface” for rotor
wing aircraft (helicopters).20
Those, and myriad other operating regulations, are promulgated by the
FAA and apply to all aircraft in the United States.21 The FAA defines
“aircraft” as “a device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the
air.”22 This broad definition could strictly encompass paper airplanes
folded by restless students, but the FAA has made a practical policy decision to essentially ignore small model aircraft and other similar things.
Although no definition currently exists for what a “model aircraft” is, if
model aircraft operators fly below 400 feet above the surface and stay away
from airports, they generally can safely ignore all the regulations that apply
to full-scale aircraft operators.23
In response to the production surge of small UAVs, the FAA has
promulgated a series of orders, which will be discussed in later sections,
regarding the operation of UAVs as a temporary stopgap, since many
13. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 256; Griggs v. Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 84 (1962); Sneed v.
Riverside, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318, 319 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
14. See Allegheny, 369 U.S. at 84-90.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. See, e.g., Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
17. Ch. 6, 44 Stat. 2119 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 171-84 (repealed 1983)).
18. See id. ch. 6, § 180, 44 Stat. at 2122 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 180 (repealed 1983)).
19. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)-(c) (2009).
20. 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d).
21. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a).
22. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1.
23. See U.S. Dep‟t of Transp., Federal Aviation Admin., Advisory Circular 91-57, Model
Aircraft Operating Standards, 1981, available at http://rgl.faa.gov/.
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operators have made the easy logical deduction that a device such as the
BAT-4 would qualify as a model aircraft and hence could be flown with
impunity under the Model Aircraft Operating Standards. Of course, UAVs
come in a wide range of sizes, but this paper will focus on small sized
UAVs to stay with the hypothetical example of a police patrol car equipped
with a UAV in the trunk.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Before examining the legal issues surrounding operation of a UAV in
domestic American airspace, an examination of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence24 will assist in fleshing out the limits of what surveillance techniques might be employed by police using UAVs and withstand constitutional muster. In the landmark case Katz v. U.S.,25 the defendant was
convicted using evidence obtained by police placing an electronic listening
device on the outside of a public phone booth the defendant used.26 The
Court rejected the government‟s argument that there had been no Fourth
Amendment violation because no physical intrusion into the phone booth
occurred.27 In doing so, the Court changed track in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, moving away from the notion that a trespass was a necessary
ingredient in a Fourth Amendment violation28 because the “Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply „areas‟—against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”29 Even though the phone booth was in a public
place, the defendant still retained some reasonable expectation of privacy—
“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”30 However, the Court
noted in the same breath that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”31 Justice Harlan highlighted that subjective reasoning in
his concurrence, where he articulated the following two part rule: “first that
24. Several commentators have argued for private tort actions (such as intrusion, trespass,
nuisance, etc.) for unwanted remote sensing of property. See, e.g. Craig, Brian, Online Satellite
and Aerial Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D. L. REV. 547, 557-58 (2007). But no private tort
action yet will lie for remotely sensing a private property owners land, either by another private
actor or a government actor. Therefore, this article‟s scope will remain focused on constitutional
claims and government actors.
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
27. Id. at 351.
28. See Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942); Olmstad v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928) (both overruled by Katz).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
30. Id. at 351-52 (alteration in original).
31. Id. at 351.
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a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
„reasonable.‟”32 The Court has seized upon that logic, holding that a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment generally occurs “when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed.”33
Surveillance by UAV combines surveillance by remote sensing and
aerial observation, both areas having been previously explored in context of
the Fourth Amendment. Katz was essentially the first remote sensing case,
since the evidence was obtained by police placing an electronic listening
device on the outside of a public phone booth.34 Remote sensing, or
gathering data from a distance, encompasses a broad range of tactics from
simple visual observation to audio enhancement as in Katz to highly
technical methods such as forward looking infrared systems (FLIR).
Remote sensing, regardless of the methodology used, falls into two
categories for Fourth Amendment purposes: “open fields” and “curtilage.”
Open fields include public areas and private property that “do not provide
the setting for those intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”35
Surveillance of open fields, or activities in open fields, simply will never
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Surveillance of curtilage, on the other
hand, may implicate the Fourth Amendment. Curtilage is a legal
“penumbra” surrounding a home, where surveillance may implicate the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.36 But the fact that “the area is within
the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thorough-fares.”37 Essentially, surveillance of an area by remote sensing
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if it is done from a public vantage point where law enforcement officers can make open observations.

32. Id. at 361.
33. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
35. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
36. U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987). Four factors determine whether an area is
“curtilage:” “[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put,
and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.” Id.
at 301.
37. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
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Regarding aerial observation from navigable airspace,38 the Court has
specifically held that surveillance of a home‟s backyard by aircraft39 or
helicopter40 is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, nor is photographing a private industrial complex from public airspace.41 The Court‟s
holdings form an “aerial surveillance trilogy”42 and the basis for aerial
surveillance Fourth Amendment law. In the first aerial surveillance case,
California v. Ciraolo,43 police flew a fixed-wing aircraft over the
defendant‟s backyard at 1,000 feet, the minimum safe altitude required by
Federal Aviation Regulations, and observed marijuana plants with naked
eye observation.44 Police used aerial surveillance because the backyard was
not visible from the ground due to an extensive fencing system.45 The
aerial surveillance formed the basis for a search warrant, and police later
found marijuana plants upon a physical search.46 Although the defendant
had fenced his yard, creating an expectation of privacy, the Court concluded
that a ground fence does not extend any expectation of privacy to be free
from aerial surveillance because routine flights exposed the backyard to
public view.47
The Court extended Ciraolo’s reach in Florida v. Riley.48 Similar to
Ciraolo, the defendant enclosed his greenhouse to prevent ground-level
observation.49 Officers used a helicopter, flying at 400 feet overhead, to
peer through openings in the greenhouse; they determined marijuana was
growing inside.50 The Court followed Ciraolo in holding that the defendant

38. “„Navigable airspace‟ means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed
by regulations . . . including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of
aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2009).
39. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-214. In this case, the observation by aircraft took place within
public navigable airspace. Id. at 213.
40. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989). In this case, the helicopter was flying within
navigable airspace. Id. at 451.
41. Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). In this case, the aircraft which the
photographs were taken was at all times within lawfully navigable airspace. Id. at 229.
42. See generally California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Reilly, 488 U.S. 445
(1989); Dow Chem v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986). The “aerial surveillance trilogy” refers to
California v. Ciraolo, Florida v. Reilly, and Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S. read together as a whole.
43. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
44. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 209-10.
47. Id. at 215.
48. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
49. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
50. Id. at 448.
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had no reasonable expectation of privacy because a helicopter flying in
navigable airspace was a routine, expected occurrence.51
Finally, in Dow Chemical Company v. U.S.,52 the Court extended
further the authority of law enforcement officers to fly over private commercial areas that would otherwise be constitutionally protected from
physical surveillance.53 Dow had also extensively enclosed its property to
prevent ground-level observation and even went so far as to investigate any
low-flying aircraft, even though it had no authority to do so.54 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), suspecting regulatory violations,
hired a commercial pilot to fly over Dow‟s property to take aerial photos.55
The EPA did not procure a search warrant prior to the flight.56 Although
the Court noted that “[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into any enclosed
area would raise significantly different questions, because „the businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about
his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private
commercial property,‟”57 the Court held that “such an industrial complex is
more comparable to an open field and as such it is open to the view and
observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public airspace.”58
Under the “aerial surveillance trilogy” canvassed above, it seems that
aerial surveillance, regardless of the method, of private or commercial
property from aircraft lawfully in navigable airspace is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment, because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in any area in open view from above—regardless of whether it is
located in an open field or within the curtilage. Each Court opinion in the
trilogy focused on an area visible from above. But recall that the “Fourth
Amendment protects people—and not simply „areas‟—against unreasonable searches and seizures.”59 The Court seems to have recently returned to
that idea in Kyllo v. U.S.60 In Kyllo, police used a thermal imaging device

51. Id. at 450-51. While operating a helicopter at 400 feet over a residential dwelling may be
technically allowed by regulation, it is neither prudent nor safe. The noise and disruption
produced would likely result in complaints and lawsuits, and the pilot‟s options for safe landing in
the event of an emergency are severely limited at that low altitude. Low-level operations are not
as routine or expected as the Ciraolo Court thinks, but the Court blessed such operations as such.
52. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
53. Dow Chem Co., 476 U.S. at 234.
54. Id. at 229.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 237 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)).
58. Id. at 239.
59. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
60. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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to detect unusual amounts of heat radiating from the defendant‟s home.61
Although the Court framed its holding around the principle that such
penetrating searches are unconstitutional absent a search warrant as a limit
on technological encroachment of privacy, the Court added the caveat “at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public
use.”62 Presumably, once a certain technology is in general public use, a
search like that in Kyllo would not be a search under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the test seems to turn on whether Wal-Mart sells it or
not.63 Notwithstanding this caveat, the Kyllo Court insisted that the technological tools employed by the government were irrelevant and focused
instead on whether the defendant (and society) had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the activities observed or information gathered.64
But society‟s reasonable expectations of privacy and tolerance for
invasion of privacy affect the limits of the Fourth Amendment, as the Kyllo
Court implicitly acknowledged with the same caveat: “We think that
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical „intrusion into a constitutionally protected area‟ constitutes a
search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general
public use.”65 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a
person has a „constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.‟
Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjecttive expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?”66
The cases of the aerial surveillance trilogy were premised upon the question
of whether flight over the subject property was common at a given altitude.
And the Court did not hesitate in proclaiming low altitude flight a common
occurrence and that society should reasonably expect as much.
Constitutionally, it seems that aerial surveillance by any method of any area
in open view from any legal altitude does not implicate the Fourth

61. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
62. Id. at 34.
63. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment
to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1331-35 (2002) (explaining that
well established technologies can change reasonable expectations of privacy).
64. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (explaining the need for a rule governing searches and seizures
that applies despite advancing technology).
65. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
66. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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Amendment, as long as the technology used to obtain the surveillance
technology is in general public use and does not penetrate into the home.67
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT: HOW TO LEGALLY USE UAVS IN
SURVEILLANCE (IT‟S NOT GOING TO BE EASY)
Because aerial surveillance of an area in open view from a legal altitude using technology in general public use that does not penetrate into a
home does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, it would seem to be a
simple matter for law enforcement agencies to purchase and use small,
autonomous UAVs like the BAT-4 or its equivalent described earlier. But
the FAA has taken the position that “no person may operate a UAS in the
National Airspace System without specific authority.”68 The FAA defines
that specific authority on whether the operation is amateur, public, or
civil.69 For amateur model aircraft the authority is FAA publication AC 9157.70 For UAS operations as a public aircraft the specific authority comes
by way of a Certificate of Authorization (COA).71 For UAS operations as
civil aircraft—general public use of aircraft and airspace—the authority is
granted via a special airworthiness certificate.72
A. AMATEUR MODEL AIRCRAFT
As a preliminary matter, no law enforcement agency will succeed in
arguing that its UAV is essentially an amateur model aircraft, albeit with a
very sophisticated camera attached, and therefore can be operated with
impunity under FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-57.73 The FAA intended
this advisory circular, a single-page non-regulatory opinion, to exclude
model aircraft operators from federal regulations governing aviation.74 The
FAA recognized that modelers did not pose a substantial hazard to highflying commercial aircraft, and thus directed them to operate below 400 feet
and to stay away from airports.75 This exception existed because the FAA
did not want to expend scarce resources on policing such a small, harmless
niche, as it was.

67. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 44.
68. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689,
6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91).
69. Id.
70. See Advisory Circular 91-57, supra note 23.
71. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. at 6690.
72. Id.
73. Advisory Circular 91-57, supra note 23.
74. See id.
75. Id.
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No law enforcement agency will succeed in operating a UAV under
AC 91-57 because the FAA specifically prohibits it.76 The document and
its rationale are currently being updated by the FAA because new UAVs are
much more capable than the model aircraft of yesteryear, raising safety
concerns. The FAA has the authority to regulate aircraft operations77 unless
it elects not to, as with amateur model aircraft.78 An “aircraft” is defined by
the Code of Federal Regulations as follows: “Aircraft means a device that
is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.”79 An amateur model
aircraft falls under the definition of “aircraft” because it is a device used for
flight in the air and therefore would ostensibly be regulated by the rules
provided in Title 14, Section 91 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Civil
aircraft operations in the domestic U.S. airspace are regulated by this section, which states: “Except as [otherwise] provided this part prescribes
rules governing the operation of aircraft (other than moored balloons, kites,
unmanned rockets, and unmanned free balloons and ultralight vehicles . . . )
within the United States, including the waters within 3 nautical miles of the
U.S. coast.”80
Nonetheless, the FAA will likely continue to ignore model aircraft
operations that fall below certain weight and speed parameters. Model
aircraft exceeding the performance capabilities of traditional “amateur”
model aircraft may soon be regulated by civil aviation regulations in some
fashion.
Amateur modelers may currently operate “under the radar,” but are
subject to enforcement if their models are used for commercial purposes or
compromise the safety of other aircraft or the public. “The FAA recognizes
that people and companies other than modelers might be flying UAS with
the mistaken understanding that they are legally operating under the
authority of AC 91-57. AC 91-57 only applies to modelers, and thus specifically excludes its use by persons or companies for business purposes.”81
For the time being, the FAA has decided to limit operation of UAVs to
public or civil authority.

76. Aviation Safety Unmanned Aircraft Program Office AIR-160, Interim Operational
Approval Guidance 08-01, 5 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/aircert/
designapprovals/uas/reg/media/uas_guidance08-01.pdf.
77. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a) (2009).
78. See Advisory Circular 91-57, supra note 23 (encouraging model aircraft operators to
comply with safety standards).
79. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2009).
80. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a).
81. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689,
6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
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B. PUBLIC AIRCRAFT AND THE CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
(COA)
Since the FAA has prohibited the use of UAVs under AC 91-57 when
used for business purposes, a law enforcement agency wishing to use UAVs
in its operations must either operate the aircraft as a public aircraft and
apply for a COA, or apply for a special Experimental Aircraft certification.
Of the two, operation as a public aircraft under a COA is currently the only
viable option, and even it remains overly burdensome. A COA is essentially a waiver by the FAA allowing operation that would otherwise be a
violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) if the operations can
be “conducted at an acceptable level of safety.”82 An example of a regulation that may be waived is FAR 91.113(b), which requires operators of aircraft to “see and avoid” other aircraft.83 But many UAV operators are
unable to comply with this regulation by definition—they are not inside the
aircraft and therefore cannot see or avoid other aircraft. Therefore, a waiver
allowing operation might require a ground or airborne observer to be
present at all times while the UAV is in flight to ensure an acceptable level
of safety is met.
The waiver application requires applicants to establish the UASs
“airworthiness either from FAA certification, a Department of Defense
airworthiness statement, or by other approved means. Applicants also have
to demonstrate that a collision with another aircraft or other airspace user is
extremely improbable as well as complying with appropriate cloud and
terrain clearances as required.”84 Additionally, the applicant must describe
the procedures the pilot and observer must follow. “The [pilot] is simply
the person in control of, and responsible for, the UAS. The role of the
observer is to observe the activity of the unmanned aircraft and surrounding
airspace, either through line-of-sight on the ground or in the air by means of
a chase aircraft.”85 Currently, UAV pilots do not necessarily need to hold
FAA licensure, depending on the operation, but must be medically qualified
to act as commercial pilots, as must the observer.86
The application requires a detailed discussion of launch and recovery
procedures, contingency plans in the event of loss of control or communication with the aircraft, fuel requirements, bad weather alternatives, accident
82. Id.
83. 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Aviation Safety Unmanned Aircraft Program Office, AIR-160, Interim Operational
Approval Guidance 09-01, 16 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www faa.gov/aircraft/aircert/
designapprovals/uas/reg/media/uasguidance08-01.pdf.
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and incident reporting procedures, and other details.87 Finally, the applicant
must include graphical representations of much of the above.88 The application is then reviewed operationally and technically by the FAA to ensure
compliance at the acceptable level of safety. Limitations or other provisions may be imposed as part of the approval process. According to the
FAA‟s website, “[i]n most cases, FAA will provide a formal response
within 60 days from the time a completed application is submitted.”89
Last year, the FAA received 164 COA applications and denied only
three.90 The FAA continues to be inundated with applications, having received 65 as of July 2009.91 The FAA‟s UAS Office in Washington, D.C.,
staffed with five people, estimates a processing time of approximately 60
days, consistent with its website.92
In the event of emergency, however, a COA can theoretically be
granted in as little as one hour.93 An example of an emergency COA is the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CPB) operation of their Predator MQ9 UAV over the Red River valley in eastern North Dakota and northwest
Minnesota during the spring flooding of 2009. CBP was granted a special
COA to fly over the flooded Red River and its tributaries from March 22 to
April 22, 2009.94 The images obtained from the UAV sensors were used by
the National Weather Center for flood crest prediction and monitoring, and
by the Department of Homeland Security for emergency response preparedness.95 That example proved to be a valuable political tool for CBP and
domestic law enforcement proponents of UAVs, but the backlog of COA
applicants seems to indicate that only emergencies with widespread
potential harm will be processed quickly. An ordinary missing person
search, for example, probably would not merit such expeditious processing
under the present regulatory scheme.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA) (Dec. 9,
2008), available at http://www faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/ato/serviceunits/
systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/.
90. Interview with John Page, Federal Aviation Administration Office of Unmanned Aircraft
(July 21, 2009).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Certificate of Authorization, Doc.009-EMER-4, available at North Dakota Law Review
office.
95. See Predator Drone is on Patrol, Taking Aerial Surveys of Area, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar.
25, 2009, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/41869107 html?elr=KArks:DCiUH
c3E7VnDaycUiD3aPc:Yyc:aUU.
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C. EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION
An alternative method of operating a UAV in the national air space
without a COA is under an Experimental Aircraft Certification. All aircraft
that operate in the national air space are required to meet certain minimum
levels of quality control and redundancy in their manufacturing and production processes.96 If an aircraft does not comply with those minimums,
operations may be restricted. Experimental aircraft are those aircraft
traditionally built by non-certified manufacturers or amateur builders themselves. Experimental certification is also sometimes sought by certified
manufacturers when testing prototype aircraft. Operations under an experimental certification are restricted to operating over sparsely populated areas
and away from congested airways, among other factors.97 Obviously, this
limitation hampers any potential law enforcement use of UAVs for
surveillance over populated areas. To date, fifty-four experimental certificates have been issued for UAVs.98 Several applications have been
withdrawn by the applicant, but none have been denied a certificate.99
Both the COA process and the Experimental Certification process are
burdensome for operators and industry. However, the COA seems to be the
method of choice for the main reason that an experimental certificate is
specific to one aircraft, whereas a COA is for use of certain designated
airspace by any number of aircraft. Either way, when a potential operator
wishes to obtain FAA clearance to fly a UAV in the national air space, he
or she must comply with either of those limitations or risk enforcement
action by the FAA.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The UAS industry is currently facing a bottleneck of regulation.
Operating a UAV under the guidelines for amateur model aircraft is not an
option, and the COA process and the experimental certification process are
burdensome and lengthy absent a public emergency. Industry, academe,
and regulators are searching for a new regulatory paradigm to alleviate the
bottleneck. Two major recent events bear discussing: the Small Unmanned
Aircraft System Aviation Rulemaking Committee‟s recommendations and
the current operations of the MQ-9 Predator by the United States Customs
and Border Protection on the Canadian-American border.

96.
97.
98.
99.

E.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2009) (airworthiness standards).
14 C.F.R. § 91.319(c) (2009).
Interview with Bruce Tarbart, FAA Aircraft Certification Service (June 2, 2009).
Id.
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A. SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM AVIATION
RULEMAKING COMMITTEE100
Twenty stakeholder representatives of industry, academe, and government met at length to develop a comprehensive set of recommendations for
small UAS regulatory development in the U.S. The committee focused on
balancing risk to the general public and other aircraft with the burden of
unduly restricting the development of UAS technology.101 In sum, the
committee recommended that the FAA adopt standards for UAS operations
that would allow certain kinds of operations in the national air space without special certification or authorization.102 The standards include definitions, operating rules, personnel requirements, aircraft and system
requirements, and alternative means of complying with the rules.103 All the
recommendations reflect the general consensus of the committee, unless
specially annotated where there was less than a general consensus. If that
was the case, alternative views were included along with accompanying
rationale.104 The standards would define and regulate model aircraft and
divide UASs into multiple categories.105 Model aircraft would be defined
as those aircraft “operated by hobbyists for the sole purpose of sport,
recreation, and/or competition.”106 Additionally, model aircraft would be
limited to a certain mass and speed capability, the specific values of which
were in conflict.107
All other UASs would be divided into five groups. Group I would be
frangible aircraft weighing less than 2 kg with a maximum speed of 30
knots air speed at full power, operated at less than 400 feet above the surface.108 Group II includes aircraft weighing less than 2 kg with a maximum
speed of 60 knots, operated at less than 400 feet above the surface but with
some notification required in busy airspace.109 Group III includes aircraft
weighing up to 9 kg with no speed limit, operated up to 700 feet above the

100. U.S. Dep‟t of Transp., Federal Aviation Administration, Order 110.150 (Apr. 10, 2008),
available at http://www faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/1110.150.pdf.
101. Small Unmanned Aircraft System Aviation Rulemaking Committee Comprehensive Set
of Recommendations for UAS Regulatory Development (proposed Apr. 1, 2009) at iii, available
at
http://www faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/avs/offices/air/hq/engineering/uapo/
rulemaking/media/sUASARCRecs.pdf.
102. Id. at iii-iv.
103. Id. at vii-x.
104. Id. at iv.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id. at 7-8.
108. Id. at 22-23.
109. Id. at 25.
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surface with notification required.110 Group IV includes aircraft weighing
up to 25 kg with no speed limit, operated up to 1,200 feet above the surface.111 All Group IV aircraft must be operated in uninhabited and remote
areas, and they will need special permission from the FAA to operate,
presumably because of their higher mass and velocity and consequent risk
to others.112 Finally, Group V aircraft are lighter-than-air UASs, and no
recommendations were made regarding their characteristics and use.113
Stakeholders are still reacting to the committee‟s recommendations,
and the reactions are mixed.114 Some commentators have expressed concern that operators of small UAVs are getting short shrift.115 Others,
notably larger manufacturers, feel the new regulations will allow UAS
operations sooner than they would otherwise.116 Because of the mixed reactions, FAA is reviewing the committee's recommendations in conjunction
with a Safety Management System review.117 “The outcome of those
activities is expected to be a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [NPRM], but
a definitive timeline for the publishing of the NPRM has not yet been
established.”118
B. MQ-9 (PREDATOR) OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN BORDER
In compliance with an existing COA, Customs and Border Protection is
operating an MQ-9 Predator UAS in its mission of guarding the U.S.
borders and law enforcement.119 Concurrently, the University of North
Dakota is collaborating with several partners in UAS education and
research.120 Some of the projects include sensing systems to allow UAS
operations in unrestricted airspace, improvements in sensor platforms, and
payload testing. UAS operators have informally assisted local law enforcement agencies by surveying a moving vehicle suspected to be trafficking
110. Id. at 27.
111. Id. at 28-30.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 30.
114. Interview with Professor Douglas Marshall, member of the rulemaking committee, in
Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 2009).
115 See, e.g., DIY Drones Blog, available at http://diydrones.com/profiles/blogs/705844:
BlogPost:32836 (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
116. See John Croft, AUVSI Special: Industry raises the UAV ante, FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM,
Feb. 8, 2009, http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/08/04/330418/auvsi-special-industryraises-the-uav-ante html.
117. Interview with Bruce Tarbart, FAA Certification Service (June 2, 2009).
118. Id.
119. CBP Mission Statement and Core Values, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/
guardians xml (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
120. UND Aerospace, http://www.uasresearch.com/home/default.asp?L1=2&a=30 (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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drugs.121 In addition to appearing effortless, the tracking of suspects is
excellent training for UAS pilots.
Notably, the Predator is unable to peer through windows in houses for
two reasons: first, infrared sensing is not able to penetrate glass because the
glass is “cold” relative to the inside of the house, and appears opaque to the
sensor. Second, visual sensors are unable to see through the window due to
light reflection at the angle of sensing used in an airborne sensor. Because
of those physical limitations, Predator‟s current sensor technologies as
directly observed by the author do not violate the principles laid down by
the aerial surveillance trilogy of cases and Kyllo. A sensor platform like
Predator, when operated in navigable airspace, has essentially the same
capabilities and physical limitations as a human observer in a manned
aircraft, and hence warrantless surveillance by such a system does not likely
violate the Fourth Amendment. In the probable event that more advanced
sensors are developed that can penetrate opaque walls or roofs, use of such
an invasive system would require a search warrant under Kyllo.
V. CONCLUSION—A BRAVE NEW WORLD WATCHED OVER BY
BIG BROTHER?
It is easy to lose oneself in wonder at the dizzying parade of new technologies that allow surveillance of almost any physical area, but it is
essential to recall the fundamental constitutional principle from Katz, that
the “Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply „areas‟—against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”122 Even though the current crop of
UAS sensors do not appear to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the
question of whether new technologies will violate those principles we hold
inviolate must be examined.
In this information age where one can view most street corners or
houses anywhere in the U.S. at anytime via a “Smartphone” coupled with
Google Street View, which allows users to “virtually” explore neighborhoods at street level,123 our current Constitutional jurisprudence regarding
surveillance and privacy may be inadequate because everyone can indeed
purchase truly sophisticated surveillance tools at Wal-Mart. Because such
technology is in general public use, our reasonable expectations of privacy
under Kyllo seem to be shrinking quickly. Until now, the sky has been the
province of the birds and airliners going to faraway places. Aerial
surveillance, while not unconstitutional and not unknown, was nonetheless
121. The author has personally observed this cooperation.
122. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
123. Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/help/maps/streetview/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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relatively rare. Even though the aerial surveillance trilogy seems to approve
the use of UAVs in domestic surveillance, “[t]he touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is [still] whether a person has a „constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.‟”124 And a person‟s reasonable
expectation of privacy is necessarily subjective. If a person reasonably
expects privacy, that person will likely have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy [in the object of the challenged search].”125
When a large enough group of people start to manifest subjective expectations of privacy, “society [becomes] prepared to recognize [that expectation] as reasonable,”126 the expectation becomes objective, and courts adopt
it. Thus are societal limits on government surveillance created, with notions of what should be public or private fluctuating with the general social
mores of the time.
With the current social trend of publicizing private details of life on
social networks like Facebook,127 MySpace,128 blogs, and Twitter,129
concurrently with the public fear of terrorism, the subjective expectations of
individual citizens and the objective expectations of society may lead the
courts to re-define unreasonable searches and seizures. Regarding UAVs
specifically, their eventual use in domestic law enforcement is a near
certainty. But the extent of that use is unknown. It is happening already on
the northern border of the United States and a ripe market exists. The use
of UAVs in domestic law enforcement will not, however, be possible everywhere due to safety concerns or congestion. The existing federal regulations are inadequate to respond to the demand, and the proposed regulations
are uncertain at best. Until the FAA publishes clear guidance for domestic
UAS operators, the current burdensome system of applying for a regulatory
waiver will ensure a bottleneck of users for several years at least. That
bottleneck will prevent law enforcement from the full use of its new tool
and effectively foreclose permanent, multi-dimensional, multi-sensory surveillance of citizens twenty-four hours a day. But when new federal regulations are codified and the bottleneck has passed and every police department does indeed have eyes everywhere, our notions of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment and reasonable searches under Kyllo will need to be
reevaluated. It seems the state will have the power, both constitutionally
and technologically, to continually monitor its citizens from above.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
Id.
Facebook, http://www facebook.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
MySpace, http://www myspace.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
Twitter, http://twitter.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).

